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IN PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Consider the following puzzle:  If earnings management is harmful to shareholders, why 
don't they design contracts that induce managers to reveal the truth?  To answer this question, 
we model the shareholders-manager relationship as a principal-agent game in which the agent 
(the manager) alone observes the economic outcome.  We show that the limited liability of 
the agent, defined as the agent's feasible minimum payment, might explain the demand for 
earnings management by the principal.  Specifically, when the limited-liability level is high 
(low), a contract that induces earnings management may be less (more) costly than a truth-
revealing contract.  This finding offers a new explanation of the demand for earnings 
management.   
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The recent events that shook the credibility of financial accounting reports raise a 
question regarding the participation of shareholders in the earnings management process.  In 
particular, since shareholders and managers act as principal and agent, why don't the former 
design a truth-inducing contract if earnings management is so harmful, especially since a 
truth-inducing contract is likely to be less costly than non-truth-inducing contracts (see, e.g., 
Lambert, 2001)?   
Previous studies have offered one of two explanations: either eliciting the truth is not 
feasible (see Arya, Glover, and Sunder, 2002), or the truth is costly to the principal for 
external reasons beyond the principal-agent relationship per se (see Ronen and Yaari, 
2002).1,2 
In this study, we provide yet another explanation that focuses on the limited-liability (LL) 
of the agent, LL, which places a lower bound on the compensation that can be paid to the 
agent.  We study a one-shot principal-agent game in which the agent alone observes the 
outcome.  We study two contracts: A report-management inducing contract (RMC) and a 
truth-inducing contract (TIC).  In the RMC regime, the agent (management) reports the 
outcome to the auditor and the auditor in return reports an audited outcome to the principal 
(investors). The auditor does not tell the principal whether his reported outcome is the same 
as what the agent reported to him.  The report to the principal depends on the degree of 
reporting flexibility that determines the maximum bias in the report, and the probability that 
the imperfect audit detects the truth.  In the TIC regime, the agent privately reports the 
                                                 
1 Arya, Glover, and Sunder (2002) and Ronen and Yaari (2002) present circumstances in which no truth-
inducing contract can achieve a superior payoff.  The former study is a review of analytical research that 
establishes the value of earnings management in principal-agent contracts when the Revelation Principle does 
not hold.  The latter focuses on the Revelation Principle’s confidentiality requirement: the agent is supposed to 
communicate the truth to the principal confidentially, since, if it is aware of such communication, a third outside 
party can induce public disclosures that are undesirable to the principal.   
 
2 For example, a company many not wish to reveal adverse information that could cause a drop in its shares’ 
price below a threshold level, which in turn could trigger harmful consequences due to contractual provisions 
with creditors.  
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outcome to the auditor and the principal; the two reported outcomes can differ and neither the 
auditor nor the principal knows what was reported to the other. The contractible information 
consists of the auditor’s report and the agent’s report to the principal.  The principal can 
compare the two reported outcomes and then penalize the agent if the audited report differs 
from the agent’s private report to the principal. 
In the first part of the paper, we characterize the shape of the LL contracts. We find that 
although LL introduces flat regions into both contracts, LL affects the RMC and TIC 
contracts differently. Consider first the RMC.  We show that under plausible conditions on 
technology and the degree of reporting flexibility, RMC is a strictly increasing function of 
reported outcome. Introducing LL forces payments for low reported outcomes to be set at the 
newly introduced LL level, even when such payments would have been lower in the absence 
of limited liability.  Hence, an RMC is a piece-wise contract with a single flat step (the 
lowest, leftmost region), but a smooth upward rising schedule thereafter (see Figure 2). 
Increasing the LL level would increase the width of the flat step.  However, the flat step 
cannot include the highest reported outcome: if it did, the contract would consist of a flat 
wage for all reported outcomes, thus providing no incentives to exert effort.    
In a TIC, the risk-averse agent reports the truth because the truth earns him the certainty 
equivalent of a lottery between a payment upon a successful overstatement (reporting a 
"target report" that earns him more than the truth does) and a penalty upon unsuccessful 
misrepresentation; the penalty cannot fall below the LL level .  LL creates a step in the 
compensation schedule when (i) the reporting flexibility allows for different outcomes to 
share the same "target report" payment, and (ii) LL constrains the principal to design the 
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same penalty for different reported outcomes.  Consequently, a TIC is a non-decreasing 
function with a few steps.3 
Our major insight is that if LL is sufficiently high, the principal may prefer report 
management. This happens when RMC is less costly than TIC.  With high LL level, whether 
a TIC is more costly than RMC depends on the degree of reporting flexibility, and the agent's 
level of risk aversion.  Flexibility impacts the riskiness of the RMC, because it determines the 
range of realized outcomes for which the agent faces a lottery between the LL level and the 
maximum payment.  As flexibility increases, this range increases as well (see Figure 4).  This 
higher riskiness, in turn, induces the agent more effectively to exert effort, thus allowing the 
principal to decrease the maximum payment.4   
Consider now the TIC when the LL level is high.  As the analysis shows, truth elicitation 
requires that each payment equals the certainty equivalent of a lottery between the LL level 
and highest payment in the off-equilibrium event of the maximum misrepresentation allowed 
under the given reporting flexibility.  Such certainty equivalent always exceeds the LL level, 
reserving the latter as payment for the off-equilibrium event that a misrepresentation is 
detected.  Over the range of reported outcomes for which the agent faces a lottery in a RMC, 
the comparison between the expected value of such a lottery and the corresponding certainty 
equivalent payments in TIC depends on the degree to which the maximum payment in TIC 
exceeds the maximum payment in RMC, as well as on the agent’s degree of risk-aversion.  
                                                 
3 To illustrate, consider a 7-outcome example, in which the lowest outcome is Outcome 1 and the highest 
outcome is Outcome 7.  Suppose the reporting flexibility allows reporting at most three higher outcomes with 
some chance of the misrepresentation not being detected by the auditor. That is, if Outcome 1 is realized, 
reporting Outcomes 2, 3, or 4 is feasible; if Outcome 2 is realized, reporting 3, 4, or 5, is feasible and so on.    
Suppose that the agent has incentives to report the highest report that might escape detection.  Outcome 7 then is 
the "target report" of Outcomes 4, 5, and 6. Clearly, since Outcomes 4, 5 and 6 share the same gamble between 
truth-telling and misrepresentation, the payment that induces a truthful report of any of them induces truthful 
reports of the remaining two. This creates a “step” in the compensation schedule for Outcomes 4-6.  Since 
Outcomes 4-6 are “target reports” for Outcomes 1-3, a similar argument establishes that the contract has three 
steps: 1-3, 4-6, and 7.  
 
4 With low flexibility, the maximum payment must be higher to induce the desired level of effort since the risk 
otherwise imposed on the agent would be too low. 
 4 
There exist configurations wherein a lower  maximum payment in RMC caused by high 
degree of flexibility (see above discussion), a high level of LL, and low risk-aversion of the 
agent cause the RMC to be less costly than TIC (see Figure 6). 
Our study contributes to the earnings management literature that focuses on internal 
demand for earnings management, which stems from the principal-agent relationship between 
shareholders and the manager (e.g., Dye [1988], Evans and Sridhar [1996], Demski, Frimor, 
and Sappington [2004], Gao [2006], and Ronen, Tzur, and Yaari [2006]).  Both first studies 
assume that the principal is unable to elicit the truth: his only alternative to basing the 
contract on the managed report is to offer the agent a flat wage.  Because a flat wage creates 
disincentives to exert effort, a report-management equilibrium is “the lesser of two evils.”  
Dye, for example, notes:  "[A] necessary condition for the existence of an internal demand for 
management is that some dimension of management's private information cannot be 
costlessly communicated” (p.200).  He also observes that truth-telling is prohibitively costly 
(Proposition 1).  We, however, allow for the possibility of designing a TIC and are concerned 
with the conditions that make such a contract more costly than an RMC: high LL, high 
accounting flexibility, and low agent's risk aversion. 
In the last three studies, earnings management prevention is costly because it diverts 
effort of either the agent  (Demski, Frimor, and Sappington [2004]) or the board of directors 
(Gao[2006]) away from productive activity. In the Ronen, Tzur, and Yaari study, prevention 
is costly because the board wishes to avoid conflict with management; Furthermore the 
informed board benefits from earnings management by making insider trading gains.  In the 
present study, the only cost giving rise to earnings management is generated by the agent‘s 
LL.  If the LL level is low, the principal demands the truth. 
Our results also contribute to the research on LL principal-agent contracts.  In the 
accounting literature, Kwon, Newman, and Suh (2001) establish the value of conservatism as 
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a mechanism that compensates for the principal's inability to design low-outcome payments 
that are lower than the agent's LL level.  To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first 
study to analyze how LL may affect the demand for earnings-management. 
The seminal paper of Sappington (1983) opened the field of research on contract design 
for a risk-neutral agent with limited liability, followed by Demski, Sappington, and Spiller 
(1988); Innes (1990); Park (1995); Kim (1997); Basu, Bell, and Bose (2000); Demougin and 
Fluet (1998, 2001); Laux (2001); Matthews (2001), and others.  As Harris and Raviv (1979) 
have shown, when a principal contracts with a risk-neutral agent with unlimited wealth, a first-
best contract is feasible by selling the enterprise to the agent, thus imposing all risk on the agent.  
With LL, however, the first-best contract is no longer feasible. We contribute to this literature by 
studying the effect of LL on the shape on the contract when the agent is risk-averse and 
outcome is not contractible.  Sherstyuk (2000) also studies the shape of the contract when the 
agent is risk-averse.  She characterizes the principal's design of performance standards when 
the agent's LL is fixed at zero, but where the agent may face a non-monetary punishment due 
to loss of status and a bruised ego.  She finds that the contract classifies performance into 
“unsatisfactory”, “satisfactory”, and “good”.  The agent suffers a non-monetary punishment 
upon unsatisfactory performance, receives nothing when his performance is satisfactory, and 
is rewarded when his performance is good.  We, in contrast, vary the LL level and find that 
the flat intervals are an artifact of the different LL levels. 
Our study also contributes to the literature on the Revelation Principle.  Arya, Glover, 
and Sunder (1998) point out that one motivation for earnings management is the piecewise 
shape of contracts.  (Consider for example, Healy [1985].)  Yet, since the contract's shape is 
determined endogenously, it is not clear why the contract is so designed.  The Revelation 
Principal does not apply to RMC because there is no direct communication between principal 
and agent. However, the Revelation Principal does apply to the agent’s report to the principal 
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in the TIC, since the principal can commit to how he will use that report and no one else 
receives that report.   Our paper establishes circumstances under which a contract that 
induces earnings management, RMC, dominates a truth-inducing contract, TIC.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 presents the model.  Section 2 characterizes the 
contracts and compares them to each other.  Section 3 summarizes.  Proofs are relegated to 
the Appendix. 
The Model 
The firm is a contract between a risk-neutral principal (investors) and a risk-averse, work-
averse agent (management). The latter exerts unobservable effort, a, which together with 
nature generate an economic outcome, x, x ∈X, X={x1,x2,…,xN}, where xi< xi+1, 1≤i<i+1≤N.5  
The agent alone observes x before privately and confidentially communicating a message 
about x to an auditor, who issues an imperfectly audited, public report to the principal, r,  
r ∈ R, where R = X is the set of possible reports by the auditor.6   
The principal designs the agent's incentive contract, T, where each payment, denoted by t, 
t∈T, is bounded from below by the limited liability (LL) level of the agent, ℓ, T: R → [ℓ, ∞ ).7  
Since LL arises from a variety of causes, such as bankruptcy constraints,8 minimum wage 
regulations, and custom, it can either restrict penalties paid by the agent, ℓ <0, or requires the 
                                                 
5
 In what follows, decision variables/functions are italicized. 
 
6 We employ a single-agent, one-dimensional effort, principal-agent model.  For multi-tasking models, consult 
e.g., Feltham and Xie (1994); and for multi-tasking, multi-agent models, see Feltham and Hofmann (2005) and 
the citations therein. Restricting analysis to a single-dimension setting is equivalent to assuming that earnings 
management consumes a negligible amount of the effort of the manager that could otherwise be directed for 
production-investment decisions.   Since, realistically, earnings management requires the cooperation of agents, 
extending the analysis to a multi-agent model is likely to strengthen our results when the principal cannot 
enforce a full-commitment regime whereby every agent commits not to collude at the principal’s expense.      
 
7 t is the amount paid by the principal to the agent. A Negative t refers to a payment of –t from the agent to 
principal.  
 
8
 We use to LL as a code for any restriction that places a lower bound on payment to the agent.   The case in 
which ℓ=0 characterizes the bankruptcy constraint that the agent does not pay the principal from private funds 
(see, e.g., Matthew [2001, p.1). 
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principal to make a minimum payment to the agent, ℓ≥0.  We assume that max( , ),∈ −∞   
where ℓ → −∞ captures the no LL case, and ℓmax is the highest LL level that still leaves such 
surplus for the principal as would make him willing to contract.  
The principal maximizes his expected residual share, x – t(r); the agent maximizes his 
expected utility over compensation, t, and effort, a, U(t,a).  We adopt the common  
assumption that the risk-averse, work-averse agent's payoff is separable in monetary transfer 
and effort, U(t,a) = U(t) – V(a), where U′> 0, U′′< 0, V′ > 0 and V′′ > 0.  The agent can 
obtain a reservation utility level of U0 with alternative employment.9 
The time-line of the main events is depicted in Figure 1. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
----------------------------------- 
 
Note that the Date-7 reimbursement to the principal is made long after the agent quits, so 
that the principal's knowledge of x at that time cannot be used to induce the agent to reveal 
the outcome in a timely fashion on Date 4. 
Assumptions 
A1:  The agent chooses between a poor-performance effort, ap, and a good-performance 
effort, ag, a∈{ap,ag}, where ap<ag.  Having a binary choice set entails little loss of generality, 
since "much of the general insights from studying hidden action models can be conveyed in 
the simplest setting, where the agent has only two actions to choose from" (Hart and 
Holmstrom, 1985, p. 79) 
We make the following common assumptions: 
(i)  i g
i p
Prob(x )
Prob(x )
a
a
 is a strictly increasing function of i. 
                                                 
9
 Our assumption that ℓ and U0 are independent parameters is innocuous because we compare the alternative 
contracts across the same parameters.   
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This is the well-known strict Monotone Likelihood-Ratio Condition (MLRC) (see 
Rogerson [1985] and Matthews [2001]).  A higher outcome is a more convincing signal that 
the agent chose the good-performance effort level.  Like Matthews (2001), we adopt this 
assumption in the strictly increasing version. Our motivation is to ensure that flat regions in 
the compensation schedules are not driven by the technology.  
(ii)   The principal always prefers the good-performance effort. 
The principal prefers to bear the cost of incentives rather than forgo the expected benefit 
of a good-performance effort, ag.  Hence, a flat-wage contract is never optimal. 
A2:  We denote the agent's disclosure strategy by Dm, Dm: X→X.  By the one-sided 
monitoring technology of Schwartz (1997) and Ronen and Yaari (2002), the truth is 
verified perfectly. Misrepresentation within the range accorded by reporting flexibility is 
detected with probability pi, ½<pi<1,10 while misrepresentation beyond the range accorded 
by reporting flexibility is always detected.  The reporting flexibility parameter that 
determines the maximum absolute bias that is stochastically feasible is denoted by q, 
1 q N-1≤ ≤ .11  The combined effect of audit detection probability and reporting flexibility 
is such that when the truth is xi, the firm either reports the truth, r=xi, or misrepresents, 
r=xj, j≠i, with the following probabilities:   
i i m i j
1 if j i or j i >q]}
Prob[r=x x x , (x ) x ]
pi if  j i, j i q},D
 = −
= = = 
≠ − ≤
   
j i j m i j
1 pi if  j i q
Prob[r=x x x x , (x ) x ]
  0 otherwise
D
 − − ≤
= ≠ = = 

 
                                                 
10
 The independence of the detection probability, pi, of outcome is crucial for our proofs that the contracts are 
increasing functions of the reports.  Without such independence, the comparison between the first-order 
conditions of two adjacent reports is a meaningless exercise. 
11
 For example, if q=N-1 and the outcome is x1, the agent may successfully pass it off as x2, or, x3,…, up to 
x1+q= x1+(N-1)= xN.   However, if q=1, the agent may successfully pass off x1 only as x2, x2 only as x3,…, xN-1 only 
as xN. 
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Similar to Dye (1988) and Evans and Sridhar (1996), our reporting technology allows for 
report management, but it sets a limit on how large the gap between the truth and the 
managed report may be. Hence, the report is informative.  Dye achieves this combination of 
credibility and flexibility to manage earnings by assuming that not telling the truth imposes a 
cost on the agent that increases in the degree of misrepresentation.  In our model, there is no 
cost; the gap between the truth and the communicated outcome is determined by the reporting 
flexibility parameter, q. 
In Evans and Sridhar (1996), the agent's flexibility in reporting an outcome to the 
principal that is different from the truth is a random variable, determined by the financial 
reporting system and observed by the agent alone.  The report is still informative because it is 
known that with some positive probability the agent has no flexibility at all so that the report 
must be truthful.  This is equivalent, in our framework, to assuming that q is a random 
variable and, with some positive probability, q=0.  In our model, q is deterministic. We 
achieve the combination of imperfect credibility and report-management flexibility by 
assuming that the report is imperfectly audited: pi > ½ lends credibility, while pi < 1 and q≥0 
lend a measure of flexibility. 
 
Analysis 
2.1.  The Report-Management-Inducing Contract (RMC) 
In this section, we characterize the contract that is based on the public report, r—the 
report-management-inducing contract (RMC).  We denote it by C (i.e., T=C), with a generic 
element ci.  That is, C(r) = Nk k=1{ (x )} .c  
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We solve the game backwards.  The last move is made by the agent who, after observing 
outcome xi, x=xi, chooses the disclosure to the auditor:12 
m i j
i m i i k
i,k, 1 i N, 1 i q k i+q N,
(x ) x if:
piU( (x )) (1 pi)U( ( (x ))) piU( (x )) (1 pi)U( (x )), (1)
D
c c D c c
∀ ≤ ≤ ≤ − ≤ ≤ ≤
=
+ − ≥ + −
 
The agent chooses the report that maximizes his expected payoff; we refer to this report 
as the target report.13  The final report is either the truth, j=i, in which case the agent collects 
ci for sure, or an undetected misrepresentation, j≠i.   
Next, the agent chooses effort, which, by our assumption A1(ii), is the good-performance 
effort, a=ag.  By (1),  
{ }
{ }
N
i g i m i g
i=1
N
i p i m i p
i=1
Prob[x ] piU( (x )) (1 pi)U( ( (x ))) V( )
Prob[x ] piU( (x )) (1 pi)U( ( (x ))) V( ). (2)
a c c D a
a c c D a
+ − − ≥
+ − −
∑
∑
 
The agent’s expected utility from exerting the good-performance effort is at least as high 
as his expected utility from exerting the poor-performance effort. 
Finally, we solve for the equilibrium contract by rearranging (1) and (2) and substituting 
them into the principal’s program.  The equilibrium contract is the solution of the following 
optimization program:14 
                                                 
12
 We restrict attention to the pure strategy equilibrium. The mixed-strategy equilibrium is given in the working 
paper version.  
 
13 Formally: In a RMC, a report, r=xj, is a target report for xi, if c(xj) = max{c(xk)}, 1≤i-q≤j,k≤i+q≤N.   
14  Note that  (IC.Dm) is derirved from  rearranging  (1) . 
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{ }
{ }
{ }
N
i g i i m i
N i=1
i i=1 m
N
i g i m i g 0
i=1
N
i g i p i m i g p
i=1
(x )} ,
Prob[x ] x pi (x ) (1 pi) ( (x ))max
{
s.t.
Prob[x ] piU( (x )) (1 pi)U( ( (x ))) V( )  U . (PC)
[Prob[x ] Prob[x ] piU( (x )) (1 pi)U( ( (x ))) V( ) V( ). (IC. )
i,k 1 i-q
c D
a c c D
a c c D a
a a c c D a a a
− − −
+ − − ≥
− + − ≥ −
∀ ≤ ≤
∑
∑
∑
m i j k m
i
j,k i+q N, U( ( (x )=x )) U( (x )). (IC. )
  i, i=1,2,...,N, (x ) . (LC)
c D c D
c
≤ ≤ ≥
∀ ≥ 
 
Note that unless the agent reports the truth, Dm(xi)=xi, or chooses a “big lie,” 
Dm(xi)=xj, j i ,q− >  the agent’s compensation given the realized outcome is xi is a 
gamble between the payment upon successful misrepresentation (with probability of 1−pi) 
and payment upon truth telling (with probability pi). 
Denote by (IC.Dmji) and (IC.Dmki) the disclosure constraints when the target report for 
xj is xi, Dm(xj)=xi, and the target report for xk is different from the feasible xi, Dm(xk)≠xi, 
 |i-k|<q,i≠k, respectively.  Denote by λC, µ C, jiCη , kiCη , and iCδ , the Lagrange multipliers 
of (PC), (IC.a), (IC.Dmji), (IC.Dmki,), and (LCi), respectively.  The solution yields the 
following N equilibrium conditions: 
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i
i i
ji ki i
j,1 i-q j i+q N k, 1 i-q k i+q N
i
i i j m j i
j
Prob[r=x ]1i, i=1,2,...,N,    1
U ( (x )) Prob[r=x ]
, (3)
Prob[r=x ]
where Prob[r=x ] piProb[x ] (1 pi) Prob[x=x , (x ) x ].
gC C
p
C C C
g
g g
a
c a
a
a a a D
λ µ
η η δ
≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
 
 ∀ = + − +
′   
− +
= + − =
∑ ∑
∑
 
Note that the equilibrium conditions are determined by the probabilities of the reports, 
which are determined, in turn, by the agent’s disclosure strategy.   
We now characterize the equilibrium combinations of disclosure strategies and contracts 
in Proposition 1. 
 
PROPOSITION 1: 
Let either:    (i)   q=1, or 
 (ii)  q > 1, and the following (MLC) obtains: 
i-q g i g
i+1-q g i+1 g
i, 1 i q i N 1,
Prob[x=x ] Prob[x=x ]
, (MLC)
Prob[x=x ] Prob[x=x ]
a a
a a
∀ ≤ − ≤ ≤ −
≥
   
(a)  The equilibrium unlimited-liability RMC is a strictly increasing function of the 
public report, r, * * *1 2 N(x ) (x ) ... (x )c c c< < < .  The agent inflates the disclosure to 
the auditor up to the maximum message that might elude detection; i.e., 
*
mD (xi)=xmin{i+q,N}. 
(b)  The equilibrium LL RMC is a piecewise contract, where below a threshold 
report, payments are set at the LL level, ℓ, and above the threshold report, the 
contract is a strictly increasing schedule.  That is, there is a critical k, such that  
 13 
ℓ= * 1(x )c  =…= * * *k k+1 N(x ) (x ) ... (x )c c c< < < ; k is determined by the number of 
binding (LCi), and, at most, the first N-1 payments are set to the LL level, ℓ., i.e., 
1≤k≤N-1.  The agent inflates the message (reports the truth) if successful 
misrepresentation awards him (no) more than the LL-level:  
* *
min{i+q,N} i min{i+q,N}*
m i *
i min{i+q,N}
x if (x ) (x )
(x ) .
x if (x )
c c
D
c
 < 
=  
=  
 
  
Proposition 1 characterizes the equilibrium.  The agent discloses the maximum outcome 
that may elude detection to the auditor, and the principal designs a strictly increasing 
schedule when LL does not affect the contract.  Although a strictly increasing schedule is 
quite common in the agency literature, note that there is a significant difference between an 
RMC and a contract based on observed outcomes.  By the MLRC, a higher report under the 
latter contract is good news with respect to effort, but when a contract is based on a report 
that might be managed, a higher report may not be good news, because the agent may have 
manipulated the report.  That is, although i g
i p
Prob[x ]
Prob[x ]
a
a
 is a monotone increasing function of i, 
*
k g m
*
k p m
Prob[r=x , ]
Prob[r=x , ]
a D
a D
 may not be.  Hence, RMC is a strictly increasing schedule when the 
technology preserves the same ordering of the reports as the MLRC's ordering on outcomes, 
so that higher reports are better news on effort than lower reports.  We identify two such 
conditions.  One is that flexibility is small, q=1 (a necessary and sufficient condition). The 
other is that the technology is concave, so that the higher the outcome, the lower the impact 
that the noise in the report that arises from earnings management has on the relative 
probabilities of consecutive reports.     
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When the contract is an increasing function, the agent inflates the report. He either reports 
the maximum feasible report given flexibility q, *m i(x )D =xi+q or the maximum report, 
*
m i(x )D =xN if i+q ≥N.  
Even if q=1 or q>1 and the (MLC) obtains, LL, which guarantees that no payment is 
lower than ℓ, flattens the contract and thus prevents it from being a strictly increasing 
function.  An RMC might induce costless truth-telling locally for one or more outcomes 
contained in any flat region that ranges over at least q+1 outcomes.15  Note that at most only 
N-1 payments can be set to the LL level, because by assumption A1(ii) a flat wage contract 
could not be an equilibrium. 
Figure 2 depicts the equilibrium in a five-outcome setting with q=1 when (LCi) are 
binding for the three lowest payments, i=1,2,3.  For shorthand, c*(xi)=ci. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here. 
----------------------------------- 
When MLR does not obtain, the game does not have a pure strategy. See details in our 
working paper.   
 
2.2.  The Truth-Inducing Contract (TIC) 
In this section, we characterize a contract that induces truth-telling.  An immediate 
candidate is a contract based on r alone that induces the agent to make a truthful disclosure to 
the auditor. However, a contract that provides incentives both to exert the good-performance 
effort and to disclose the truth does not exist.16  To find a truth-inducing contract we invoke 
                                                 
15  For example, observe that when x=x1, Dm(x1)=x1+q, since both x1 and x1+q are contained in the flat region, the 
agent is not paid more by inflating his report.     
16 Formally, a contract based on r alone that induces truthful disclosure to the auditor satisfies the (IC.Dm) 
constraints that state that truthful disclosure is preferable to disclosing some target outcome.  Consider (IC.Dm) 
for two outcomes, i and j, such that j i q ,− ≤ j i.≠  
 
 15 
the Revelation Principle, by which there is no loss of generality in restricting analysis to an 
incentive-compatible contract.  The appeal to the Revelation Principle implies augmenting 
the game with a communication phase between the principal and the agent (see Myerson 
[1991]).17  We denote the agent's strategy of disclosure to the principal by Dp, Dp: X→ X, 
assuming that this disclosure is made after the agent has observed the outcome (on Date 3) 
but before the agent provides a report to the auditor (on Date 4).  Consequently, under a truth-
inducing contract (TIC), the principal receives two signals: direct disclosure from the agent 
and an imperfect report from the auditor.  Furthermore, by the Revelation Principle, the 
principal designs a contract, S, that induces the agent to report the truth, Dp(x)=x. 
In what follows, we denote the TIC by S with a generic element by i j(x , x )s , where i and j 
index the disclosure of xi to the principal, Dp(xi)=xi, and the audited report of xj, r=xj, 
respectively, Ni j i,j=1{ (x , x )} .S s=   In the following, we skip the details of the agent’s decisions, 
which are similar to those discussed above for an RMC.  Under truth-revelation, and by our 
assumption that the principal prefers to induce the agent to exert the good-performance effort, 
ag, the principal designs S(Dp,r) that solves the following program: 
                                                                                                                                                        
i i i j mij
j j j i mji
If x=x ,   U( (x )) piU( (x )) (1 pi)U( (x )). (IC. )
If x=x ,  U( (x )) piU( (x )) (1 pi)U( (x )). (IC. )
c c c D
c c c D
≥ + −
≥ + −
 
 
Rearranging yields a set of two equations: i jU( (x )) U( (x ))c c≥  and i jU( (x )) U( (x ))c c≤ .  Clearly, these 
equations must hold as a strict equality; i.e., i j(x ) (x ).c c=   Since this equality holds for any pair of i and j with 
a distance of q between them, it holds globally.  A flat wage contract violates A1(ii). 
17 Myerson [1991]:  
 
It may be natural to ask why we have been focusing our attention on mediated communication 
systems in which it is rational for all players to obey the mediator. The reason for this focus is 
that such communication systems can simulate any equilibrium of any game that can be 
generated from any given strategic-form game by adding any communication system. (p. 
255; emphasis added) 
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The principal maximizes his expected payoff subject to the contract guaranteeing the 
agent his reservation utility so that he is willing to participate in the contract (PC).  The 
contract provides the agent with incentives to exert the good-performance effort (IC.a) and to 
make disclosures to the auditor (IC.Dm) and to the principal (IC.Dp), and no payment can be 
lower than the LL level (LC). 
An examination of the principal's program reveals an indeterminacy regarding the 
disclosure to the auditor.  Although the Revelation Principle prescribes that the message sent 
to the principal be truthful (since the agent's message choice has no "real" effects and the 
principal controls how the message influences the agent's compensation), it does not make 
the same prescription for the disclosure made by the agent to the auditor.  The outcome of 
this disclosure depends on the monitoring technology, and it is not contractible, i.e., the 
principal cannot commit to how the auditor will respond to the agent’s reported outcome.  
The Revelation Principle prescribes, however, that the principal gives the agent instructions 
on what to disclose to the auditor and, through the design of the contract, provides the agent 
with incentives to follow the instructions.  What will the principal’s instructions be? 
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There are many candidate answers:  "tell the truth," "inflate the messages by q', q'≤q," 
"smooth by inflating high outcomes and deflating low outcomes," and so on.  One thing is 
clear: the instruction will ensure that the audited report is informative, in that it can be used to 
auditor the message to the principal.  For example, suppose that the agent reports the truth to 
the principal and is instructed to inflate the disclosure to the auditor by one outcome; i.e., 
Dm(xi)=xmin{i+1,N}.  If the principal observes a message of xi and an audited report of xi, or a 
message of xi and an audited report of xi+1, he pays the agent the amount corresponding to xi.  
Any other message triggers a penalty.  The agent is deterred from communicating xi+2 to the 
auditor, Dm(xi)= xi+2, by a penalty if r=xi+2, which can occur with probability of 1−pi. 
In what follows, we solve the principal's program, assuming that the agent discloses the 
truth to the auditor, and then in Proposition 2 we prove that such a strategy is an equilibrium.  
We claim that there is no loss of generality in assuming that the principal instructs the agent 
to disclose the truth to the auditor, as any contract with (truth-revealing) external report 
management (r≠x) and internal truth-telling (Dp(x)=x) yields the same payoffs as the one with 
no earnings management.18   
The other side of the coin of the fact that a truthful disclosure entails no loss of generality 
is that there are also equilibria with external earnings management—combining a false 
disclosure to the auditor with a truthful disclosure to the principal.  Thus there appears to be 
yet another answer to our research question:  "If earnings management is harmful to 
shareholders, why don't they design contracts that induce managers to reveal the truth?"  
Shareholders indeed may not consider earnings management to be harmful (see, e.g., the 
                                                 
18  To see this point, compare two disclosure strategies: 
If Dm(xi) = xi,  U(s(xi,xi)) ≥ (1−pi)U(s(xj,xs)) + piU(ℓ),                    j,s,=1,2,…,N,  s≠i.  
If Dm(xi) = xk, xk ≠ xi, piU(s(xi,xi)) + (1−pi)U(s(xi,xk)) ≥ 
                                                                 (1−pi)U(s(xj,xs)) + piU(ℓ),   j,s,=1,2,…,N, s≠k.  
Since the argument on the left-hand side of the second equation represents the disclosure when the agent follows 
the principal's instructions, there is no difference between the first and second equations when s(xi,xk)= s(xi,xi).  
By the informativeness criterion of Holmstrom (1979), and by virtue of the fact that r=xk is as informative as a 
report of r=xi , it can be shown that the equality of s(xi,xk)= s(xi,xi) obtains from the first-order conditions of the 
principal's program. 
 18 
price-maximizing owners in Ronen and Yaari [2002]), and they can have both external 
earnings management and internal truth-telling if they so wish.  
To solve the program, we reintroduce the concept of a target report.  
DEFINITION 1:  In a TIC, a report r=xj is a target report for xi if  
s(xj,xj) = max{s(xk,xk)}, 1≤i-q≤j,k≤i+q≤N.   
Target reports are vital to the design of a TIC because the agent is willing to reveal the 
truth only when truth-telling yields a higher expected payoff than the disclosure of the target 
report.  If the agent attempts to falsely disclose the target report, he faces a gamble: with 
probability pi, the auditor discovers the truth and the agent is penalized, and with probability 
of 1−pi the agent succeeds and earns the payoff of the target report.  By the Maximum 
Deterrence Principle (Kofman and Lawarree [1993]), the penalty equals the lowest possible 
level—the agent's LL level, ℓ; i.e., s(xj,xi) =ℓ for every j, j≠i. 
We now solve a reduced program that ignores some of the constraints.  As Christensen 
and Feltham (2005) note, when the principal-agent contract requires the agent to take more 
than one action, there is a hierarchy of constraints, in that the “single" shirking constraints 
require that the agent does not deviate from the equilibrium in a choice of one action only, the 
"double" shirking constraints require that the agent does not deviate from the equilibrium in 
two actions only, and so on.  Since in our setting the agent takes three actions—effort, 
disclosure to the auditor, and disclosure to the principal, the principal's program contains 
three levels of constraints.   We solve a reduced program with "single" shirking constraints 
only, as its solution satisfies the double/triple-shirking constraints.19  As discussed above, we 
substitute Dm(x)=x as well, relegating the proof that the solution of the reduced program 
satisfies (IC.Dm) to Proposition 2, where we show that truthful disclosure to the auditor is 
indeed the agent's best response to the contract.   
                                                 
19 The (long and tedious) proof of this statement is available upon request from the authors.  
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A TIC then solves the following reduced program:20 
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Denote by (TCpuy) the truth-inducing constraint that deters the agent from disclosing xy to 
the principal when the outcome is xu, and; upon adopting similar notation21 to that of the 
RMC’s program denote by λS, µ S, Sijρ , kiSρ , and iSδ , the Lagrange multipliers of (PC), (IC.a), 
(TCij), (TCki,), and (LCi) respectively.  The solution yields the following N equilibrium 
conditions: 
 
     
i p
i i i g
Prob[x ]1i, i=1,2,...,N, 1
U ( (x ,x )) Prob[x ]
S S a
s a
λ µ
 
∀ = +  −  +
′   
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 In the solution of this program, it is convenient to work with rearranged (IC): 
N
i g i p i i g p
i=1
{Prob[x ] Prob[x ]}U( (x , x ) V( ) V( ).a a s a a− ≥ −∑  
21 Note that, for parsimony, we adopted the notation for (IC.Dm) in RMC to (TCij) in TIC, although  the two sets 
of constraints are different.    
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 (4) 
 
LEMMA 1:  Every payment along the equilibrium play, * i i(x , x )s , exceeds the LL level, ℓ, 
∀i, * i i(x , x )s  >ℓ.  
 
Lemma 1 states that the agent is paid in equilibrium more than ℓ, pointwise.  The reason 
is that ℓ constitutes a penalty upon discovery of misrepresentation.  Hence, the agent's payoff 
upon faithfully revealing the truth cannot equal the penalty for not revealing the truth (unless 
the contract is a flat wage that equals ℓ, which violates assumption A1(ii)).  Lemma 1 
facilitates the characterization of S, since no (LCi) is binding. 
PROPOSITION 2:   
(a) If q=1, or q>1 and at most only one (TCij) is binding, 1≤i≤N-1, 1≤i-q≤j≤i+q≤N, 
TIC is a strictly increasing schedule. That is, 
* * *
1 1 2 2 N N(x , x ) (x , x ) ... (x , x ).s s s< < <  
(b) If q>1, and at least two (TCij) are binding, 1≤i≤N-1, 1≤i-q≤j≤i+q≤N, the TIC 
contains flat regions.  It is a nondecreasing schedule with global maximum at xN. 
That is, * * *1 1 2 2 N N(x , x ) (x , x ) ... (x , x ).s s s≤ ≤ <   
(c) In equilibrium, the agent sends a truthful message to the auditor, *mD (x)=x. 
Proposition 2 characterizes the TIC, the agent's strategy of communicating to the 
auditor, and the principal's beliefs.  As expected from an incentive contract, the schedule of 
payments increases in the performance measures.  The contract is strictly increasing between 
                                                 
22
 When xi is the potential target report for xk, then, relative to k, i must satisfy that 1≤k-q≤i≤k+q≤N. 
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N-1 and N, * N N(x , x )s > * N-1 N-1(x , x )s .  Since the agent is freely willing to tell the truth when 
the true outcome earns him the maximum payoff (i.e., * N N(x , x )s ), the payment is 
determined by the incentives to exert effort, which, by the MLRC condition, yield a local 
maximum at xN.  
However, it is a priori unclear when a TIC is a strictly increasing schedule for reports other 
than xN. The answer depends on the reporting flexibility, q, and on the LL level, ℓ.  Suppose 
ℓ is sufficiently high such that two different outcomes, xi and xk, share the same target report, 
xN, because both are within a distance q from xN, 1≤N-q≤i,k≤N-1.  Their respective 
compensation is the same, because each is set to the certainty equivalent of a gamble between 
ℓ and * N N(x , x )s .  Consequently, the TIC includes at least one flat region.23  This implies 
that the flat upper region cascades to lower flat regions for the outcomes that have xi, xi+1,.., 
and xN-q-1 as target reports, and so on, if (TC) is binding for these lower outcomes as well. 
Part (c) establishes that truthful disclosure to the auditor, *mD (x)=x, is the agent’s best 
response to the contract.    
Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 2, Part (b), by showing the relationship between TIC 
payments and outcomes, where s*(xi,xk) is denoted by sik.24 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here. 
      ----------------------------------- 
Note that contracts with flat regions are common when the principal designs truth-
inducing contracts.  In Gjesdal (1989), the contract is a piecewise schedule; its increasing 
range lies on the 45o line (the x-axis is the report, and the y-axis is the payment).25  The agent 
                                                 
23 The general expression for all high outcomes that share the same target report is 
i i N NU( (x , x )) piU( ) (1 pi)U( (x , x )), N q i N 1.s s≥ + − − ≤ ≤ −     
 
24 Figure 3 is a projection of the three-dimensional contract (payment s a function of the two signals) onto the 
two-dimensional plane of payment and the private report of the agent to the principal.   
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reveals the truth because he either obtains the whole outcome or receives a fixed payment 
that is independent of what he reports.  In our study, when the agent does not have LL, the 
contract is a strictly increasing schedule because the principal can use the audited report to 
discipline the agent.  The combination of unobservability and LL creates the flat regions. 
 
2.3.  The Comparison between TIC and RMC 
In this section we compare TIC and RMC.  Since the contractible information in the 
RMC model (i.e., the auditor's report) is a subset of the contractible information in the TIC 
model, it follows immediately that the principal is never worse off with the TIC performance 
measures unless the contract space is more constrained in the latter than in the former.  We 
show below that LL (along with two other conditions) determines whether a TIC is more 
constrained.  If LL is too low to affect the contract (i.e., none of the (LC) and (TC) 
constraints is binding), a TIC is less costly than an RMC, because it is equivalent to a 
contract that is based on the actual outcome, x, rather than on a noisy measure of the 
outcome, r.  If LL affects the design of a TIC, eliciting the truth may be too costly.  This 
situation results from the different roles of LL in the two types of contracts.  In an RMC, LL 
guarantees a minimum payment to the agent.  Without it, the principal prefers to pay the 
agent less.  The cost of an RMC increases in LL because increasing LL will increase the risk 
premium that must be paid due to the incentive risk used to motivate the agent’s actions.  In a 
TIC, the minimum payment, ℓ, acts as a lower-bound constraint on the penalty that can be 
                                                                                                                                                        
25
 The principal-agent game with an unobservable outcome and a perfect, costly monitor employed 
stochastically has been studied by Townsend (1979); Baiman and Demski (1980); Evans (1980); Gale and 
Hellwig (1985); Baiman, Evans, and Noel (1987); Border and Sobel (1988); Gjesdal (1989); and others. In 
Evans (1980), the monitor accurately detects both outcome and effort.  Baiman and Demski (1980b) analyze a 
game in which the outcome is observable, but its decomposition into quantity and price variance is not. The 
principal must decide whether to monitor the agent ex post, costlessly, by acquiring information on these 
variances. They show that he prefers committing to the range of outcomes to trigger the variance analysis, rather 
than making the decision after the outcome is realized.  Baiman, Evans, and Noel (1987) consider a tripartite 
game in which an auditor is a strategic player who is an intermediary between the principal and the agent.  
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imposed. In equilibrium, the penalty is never imposed, but the threat of the penalty is crucial 
in the TIC contract.26  The cost of a TIC increases in ℓ because a higher LL level more tightly 
constrains the penalty that can be imposed. 
Let the TIC be a step function.  Index the steps in TIC by t, t=1,2,.., such that t=1 
represents the highest step in the sense of being associated with the highest payment, t=2 is 
the step associated with the second highest payment, and so on, in descending order. Define 
by t(s(.,.)) the step associated with payment s(.,.).  Denote t(s(xi,xi)) by ti.  If LL is so high 
that N-1 (TC) constraints are binding, then each payment is a linear combination of ℓ and 
*
N N(x , x )s , the relative weight depends on ti, * i iU( (x , x ))s =  U(ℓ) + 
(1−pi) it [ * N NU( (x , x ))s −U(ℓ)].   
We focus now on the equilibrium contracts when LL is high.  We compare the TIC as just 
characterized with the RMC, which is a one-step schedule in which only the maximum 
payment, cN, exceeds the agent's LL level, * N(x )c  > ℓ = * i(x )c , i=1,2,…,N-1 (because N-1 
(LCi) constraints are binding).   We refer to these contracts wherein N-1 constraints are 
binding ((whether (LCi) or (TCij)) as full LL- contracts. 
In general, we can divide the payments into three categories:   
1. If i≤N-q-1, RMC pays the agent ℓ whereas TIC pays more (see Proposition 2).   
2. When i is higher, N-q≤i≤N-1, under both contracts the agent receives the expected 
utility of a gamble between the truth-telling payoff and earning the highest 
possible payment designated for xN.  Hence, the comparison of cost is determined 
by the largest possible payment under each contract, * N(x )c  and * N N(x , x )s  and 
                                                 
26 Our study thus differs from Gao (2006) whose manager can manage earnings and pay a penalty in 
equilibrium.  The main difference between that study and ours is that in Gao's study the penalty is a parameter 
of the model.  In our study, it is designed by the principal endogenously under the condition that it does not fall 
below the LL level.  [Note that in our setting, discovery of the truth by the auditor does not trigger a penalty by 
the principal  because the negotiations between the auditor and the manager are confidential].    
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the agent’s risk premium, since TIC replaces the gamble with its certainty 
equivalent.   
3. The last category is the largest possible payoff, i=N, which again involves the 
comparison of * N(x )c to * N N(x , x ).s  
PROPOSITION 3:  
Let the TIC and RMC be  full LL contracts and let ℓ be sufficiently high such that (PC) is 
not binding. Then:   
(a) There is a critical value of q, denoted by qˆ , 1≤ qˆ ≤ N-2, such that for all q's, qˆ ≤q≤ N-
2, 
(i) the maximum payment under the TIC is larger than the maximum payment under 
the RMC, * N N(x , x )s > * N(x )c . 
(ii) the agent's payoff under the TIC is larger than his payoff under the RMC for each 
outcome; i.e., ∀ i, * i iU( (x , x ))s > EU(C*(r)xi). 
(iii) the TIC costs more than the RMC if the agent is not too risk-averse, so that 
piℓ+(1−pi) * N(x )c  < U-1(piU(ℓ)+(1−pi) * N NU( (x , x ))s ), and the principal demands 
report management. 
(b) Let q=N-1.  Then, * N N(x , x )s = * N(x )c , and the TIC replaces the RMC's gambles by 
their certainty equivalents.  The agent's utility is the same pointwise under both contracts. 
The TIC costs less than the RMC, and the principal demands the truth. 
Proposition 3 shows that a TIC might be more costly when the LL level is high, 
depending on the reporting flexibility, q, and the risk-aversion of the agent.  Part a(i) 
formulates conditions on q that guarantee that * N N(x , x )s > * N(x ).c   To understand the 
importance of the reporting flexibility, consider Figure 4.  
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----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here. 
----------------------------------- 
The expected payment to the agent conditional on realized outcome are presented for q=3 
and q=13 in an N=14 example.27 The three categories of payments are evident for q=3.  Any 
reported outcome lower than x=x11 awards the agent the LL level of 30.  But when outcome 
is x=x11, x 12, x13, the agent’s expected payment is higher than the LL level because he may 
successfully inflate the reported outcome (to x=x14).  Finally, if x=x14, he reports x=x14 and 
receives the maximum payment.  By contrast, when q=13, the first category disappears and 
the second category expands.   
As this figure illustrates, when LL is high, the riskiness of the RMC, as quantified by the 
agent’s risk premium, is attributable to two features of the contract.  One is the fact that the 
compensation for the highest reported outcome is the maximum payment under the contract.  
The second is the fact that the degree of reporting flexibility determines the range of reported 
outcomes for which the agent faces a lottery between the LL level and the maximum 
payment.  As flexibility increases, this range of reported outcomes increases as well.   Hence, 
the risk the contract imposes on the agent is higher when the degree of flexibility is higher.   
This higher riskiness, in turn, induces the agent more effectively to exert effort, thus allowing 
the principal to decrease the maximum payment. The relationship between q, which is 
positively related to the risk the agent faces by accepting lotteries, and the maximum payment 
in the RMC contract, determines the overall riskiness of the contract.  Figure 5 depicts the 
maximum payment and the risk premium of the agent for N=14 and q is varied from 1 to 13 
                                                 
 
27  Figure 4 is based on N=14, Pr(xi│ag)=0.05+0.1*(i-1) for i<14, and Pr(x14│ag)=0.155; Pr(xi│ap)=  
Pr(x14-i│ag); V(ag)=70, ℓ=30.  For presentation purposes, only the maximum payments  (373.13 for q=3 and 
613.3 for q=13) are divided by two.  
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(the same parameters as in Figure 4 where the agent’s utility function has a constant relative 
risk-aversion coefficient, U(z)=z1/2).  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here. 
----------------------------------- 
 
Part a(iii) shows that the lower payoff under RMC yields a lower contract cost if the 
agent is not too risk averse.  The agent's risk-aversion determines the savings that accrue to 
the principal under a TIC by paying certainty equivalent amounts in lieu of the lotteries that 
the agent faces in the RMC program for the same class of payments.   
Part (b) addresses the case when q=N-1.  In this case, the agent’s payoff is the same under 
both contracts, because even when outcome is as low as x1, RMC pays the agent a lottery.  
TIC dominates the RMC by replacing the RMC's lotteries with their certainty equivalents.  In 
this case, the principal demands the truth for all LL levels.  
 
PROPOSITION 4: 
Let:  
(i) q be sufficiently large, qˆ ≤q≤ N-2, and  
(ii) the agent is not too risk-averse, as defined in Proposition 3, part (c). 
Then, there exists a critical level of LL, ℓ', such that for all lower (higher) LL levels a 
TIC is less (more) costly than an RMC.  When the LL level is higher (lower) than ℓ', the 
principal demands earnings management (the truth). 
Proposition 4 is a direct result of Proposition 3, given that the contracts' cost increases in 
ℓ monotonously.  Beyond a certain level of ℓ, RMCs outperform TICs.  
The earnings management literature quite often assumes that the truth is prohibitively 
costly in order to justify the inability to invoke the Revelation Principle. This assumption is 
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introduced without motivation or explanation.  In Propositions 3 and 4, we formulate three 
conditions that make truth-telling more costly than earnings management. 
1) Limited liability. 
2) Reporting flexibility. 
3) The risk-aversion of the agent. 
LL:  When the LL level is high, so that RMC pays the agent ℓ for reporting the first N-1 
outcomes, the agent is reimbursed ℓ for sure for those outcomes with a target report that also 
pays ℓ (see Proposition 1).  In contrast, in a TIC, each payment exceeds ℓ (Lemma 1).  The 
algebra shows that when reporting flexibility is high and risk-aversion is low, this difference 
in payments to low reported outcomes make the RMC contract cheaper than TIC.  Hence, the 
principal demands earnings management.   
Reporting flexibility:  If reporting flexibility, q, is neither too low (q< qˆ ) nor too high (the 
maximum, q=N-1), the agent’s payoff under RMC is lower than under a TIC, because of the 
effect of q on the riskiness of the RMC, as discussed above.   
Risk-aversion:  The agent's risk-aversion determines the savings that accrue to the 
principal under a TIC by paying certainty equivalent amounts.  If these savings are small, an 
RMC is relatively less costly.  
Throughout the analysis, we have compared the types of contracts at a given LL level. 
Note that if the LL level changes in tandem with the reservation utility level, then the 
classification of the LL level as low (with little effect on the shape of the contract) or high 
becomes an empirical issue.  In any case, our analysis highlights the trade-offs involved in 
choosing a TIC or an RMC.  The former has the advantage of extracting a risk premium from 
the risk-averse agent, while the latter has the advantage of actually paying the agent his LL 
level, which decidedly reduces the cost of the first N-q-1 payments.  
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We conclude the paper with the following examples, depicted in Figure 6, based on the 
following parameters: N=5, q=1,2,3,4, pi=0.80, U0=V(ag)=70, V(ap)=0.  The probabilities of 
outcomes are: Pr(x=x1│ag)= Pr(x=x5│ap)=0.06; Pr(x=x2│ag)= Pr(x=x4│ap)=0.12; 
Pr(x=x3│ag)= Pr(x=x3│ap)=0.22; Pr(x=x4│ag)= Pr(x=x2│ap)=0.24, Pr(x=x5│ag)= 
Pr(x=x1│ap)=0.36. We vary the LL levels. The cohorts of four columns correspond to q=4, 
q=3,q=2,q=1, respectively. The figure shows that qˆ =1, so that the savings under an RMC (as 
compared to a TIC) are negative only when q=4, and that for some LL levels, the savings 
increase in q for q=1,2,3.  
 ----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 6 about here. 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
3.  Conclusions 
We began with the following question: If earnings management is harmful to 
shareholders, why don't they design contracts that induce managers to reveal the truth?  Our 
answer is that management’s limited liability and the prevailing reporting flexibility may 
combine to render the cost of the truth higher than the benefit from learning the truth.   
We show that when the agent’s limited liability is sufficiently high, the principal might 
prefer a contract that induces report management (RMC) because limited liability reduces the 
effectiveness of the “sticks” in the compensation schedule to such an extent that the “carrots” 
that are required to induce effort and truth-telling become too expensive. Our study thus fills 
a lacuna in the Revelation Principle literature, which recognizes that the shape of the contract 
might induce earnings management (as in Healy [1985]) while ignoring the fact that because 
a contract is endogenously determined, an explanation of why it is a priori so designed is 
warranted. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
We start the proof with the unlimited-liability contract. First we prove that when q=1 
the contract is a strictly increasing function for any disclosure strategy.  The agent’s best 
response then is to inflate the disclosure, Dm(xi)=xi+1, i <N.  We next establish the pure-
strategy equilibrium when q=2 and the (MLC) obtains. We conclude the characterization 
of the unlimited-liability contract by establishing that this equilibrium is unique.   
 As a preliminary, denote the argument that multiplies µC  as Fa(x).  As seen 
below, the proof is largely an exercise in comparing Fa for adjacent payments.  
Lemma A1: When q=1, the equilibrium contract is a strictly increasing function of 
the report (for any disclosure strategy, Dm). 
Proof:  We first assume that (IC.Dm) is not binding, and then we prove that indeed it 
is not.   
Suppose by contradiction that there is some outcome, k, such that * *k k+1(x ) (x )c c> , 
1≤k≤N-1.  Since xk+1 is no longer a target report for xk, Fa(xk+1) equals k+1 p
k+1 g
Prob[x ]
1
Prob[x ]
a
a
−  
if it is not a target report for xk+2 or 
k+1 p k+2 p
k+1 g k+2 p
Prob[x ] (1 pi)Prob[x ]
1
Prob[x ] (1 pi)Prob[x ]
a a
a a
+ −
−
+ −
if it is.  
Similarly, for *kc , Fa(xk) is k p
k g
Prob[x ]
1
Prob[x ]
a
a
−  if xk is not a target report for xk-2  and 
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k p k-1 p
k g k-1 p
Prob[x ] (1 pi)Prob[x ]
1
Prob[x ] (1 pi)Prob[x ]
a a
a a
+ −
−
+ −
if it is. By the MLRC,  
k p k-1 p
k g k-1 p
Prob[x ] (1 pi)Prob[x ]
1
Prob[x ] (1 pi)Prob[x ]
a a
a a
+ −
−
+ −
<
k p
k g
Prob[x ]
1
Prob[x ]
a
a
− <
k+1 p
k+1 g
Prob[x ]
1
Prob[x ]
a
a
− < 
k+1 p k+2 p
k+1 g k+2 p
Prob[x ] (1 pi)Prob[x ]
1
Prob[x ] (1 pi)Prob[x ]
a a
a a
+ −
−
+ −
, which yields the required contradiction.  
It is easy to verify that the solution of an RMC with nonbinding (IC.Dm) satisfies the 
principal’s program.   Q.E.D. 
The case where q>1 is relevant only if N≥3.  We still solve for the unlimited-liability 
RMC.  We show that the principal’s best response to a disclosure strategy that maximally 
inflates the report is to design a non-decreasing compensation contract, and that this 
disclosure strategy is the agent’s best response to a strictly increasing schedule. 
Let the agent manage the report by inflating the disclosure; i.e., Dm(xi)=xmin{i+q,N}.  
Then, 
i g
i m i g i-q g
i g i-q g
piProb[x ] for 1 i q
Prob[r=x ] piProb[x ] (1 pi)Prob[x ] for q+1 i N 1
Prob[x ] (1 pi)Prob[x ] for i=N
a
D a a
a a
 ≤ ≤

= + − ≤ ≤ −

+ −
 
. (A1) 
When 1≤i≤q, the report must be the truth that was discovered by the auditor; when 
q+1≤i≤N-1, either the auditor discovered the truth, or the auditor did not discover an 
attempt to issue a target report for a lower outcome; and when i=N, either the report is the 
truth, because r=xN is the target report for xN, or the auditor did not discover 
misrepresentation of a lower outcome. 
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Substituting (A1) into the first-order conditions (FOC) of the principal's program, 
noting that (IC.Dm) are not binding, yields 
i p i
i g i g
i p i p
*
i i g i g
i p i p
i g
Prob[x ]
1 for 1 i q
Prob[x ] piProb[x ]
piProb[x ] (1 pi)Prob[x ]1 1 for q 1 i N-1
U ( (x )) piProb[x ] (1 pi)Prob[x ]
Prob[x ] (1 pi)Prob[x ]
1
Prob[x ] (1 pi)Prob[x
C
C
C C
C
a
a a
a a
c a a
a a
a
δµ
λ µ
µ
 
 −  + ≤ ≤
  
 + −
 = + − + ≤ ≤
′  + −
 
+ −
−
+ − i g
.
for 1 N
]a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  =
  
  
 (A2) 
By the MLRC, the contract is a strictly increasing function for i≤q.   The comparison 
of two consecutive payments and * i+1(x )c 28 yields a strictly increasing schedule if    
i+1 p i+1-q p i p i-q p
i+1 g i+1-q g i g i-q g
piProb[x ] (1 pi)Prob[x ] piProb[x ] (1 pi)Prob[x ]
.
piProb[x ] (1 pi)Prob[x ] piProb[x ] (1 pi)Prob[x ]
a a a a
a a a a
+ − + −
<
+ − + −
  (A3) 
 In order to analyze (A3), we use the following abbreviations: 
 
 
 
 
 
(A3) then is: piA+(1 pi)E piC+(1 pi)G .
piB+(1 pi)F piD+(1 pi)H
− −
>
− −
 C is an increasing function of r only if 
pi2(AD−CB) + pi(1−pi)(AH−GB+ED−CF) + (1−pi)2(EH−GF)>0. (A4) 
                                                 
28  The proof for the comparison of c(xq) to c(xq+1) is similar to the proofs below. 
A = Prob[xi|ap] E = Prob[xi-q|ap] 
B = Prob[xi|ag] F = Prob[xi-q|ag] 
C  Prob[xi+1|ap] G = Prob[xi+1-q|ap] 
D  Prob[xi+1|ag] H 
 
= Prob[xi+1-q|ag] 
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Because the first and third arguments are positive, (A4) is positive if the second 
argument is non-negative, which obtains when F B
H D
≥ .29  The proof of the unlimited-
liability RMC is concluded upon establishing the uniqueness of this equilibrium.  The 
proof is by induction on q.   
Step 1:  The proof for q=1:  See Lemma A1. 
Step 2:  The assumption:  Suppose that this equilibrium is unique for 
some qˆ , qˆ <N-1. 
Step 3.  The proof that the equilibrium is unique for q= qˆ +1.   
Suppose that q=N-1. In this case, the agent attempts to manipulate every outcome's 
disclosure to the outcome that yields the global maximum, unless the truth coincides with 
the outcome that yields the maximum payment.  If * N(x )c  is the globally maximum 
payment, then the contract is a strictly increasing function by the MLRC.  Suppose, by 
contradiction, that the globally maximum payment is different, say * k(x )c .  It is 
immediate to see that by the MLRC, the first-order condition for N(x )c  yield a higher 
payment for N(x )c  than for k(x )c , since 
N p
N g
Prob[x ]
1
Prob[x ]
a
a
− >
k p i p
k pi,1 i ,i k
k g
k g i p
i,1 i ,i k
Prob[x ] (1 pi) Prob[x ]
piProb[x ]
1 1 .
piProb[x ]
Prob[x ] (1 pi) Prob[x ]
N
N
a a
a
a
a a
≤ ≤ ≠
≤ ≤ ≠
+ −
− = −
+ −
∑
∑
 
                                                 
29 (AH−GB+ED−CF) = [− ΒΗ G A
H B
−
 
 
 
+ FD
E C
F D
−
 
 
 
] ≥ [FD −ΒΗ] E C
F D
−
 
 
 
≥ 0.  The first inequality 
follows from the MLRC.  The second inequality obtains when 
F B
H D
≥ . 
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Next, consider qˆ+1=N-2.  If the global maximum is lower than xN and higher than x1, 
all the reports are manipulated to this global payoff report and, as proved for the case 
where qˆ+1=N-1, the required contradiction obtains. If * N(x )c  is the globally maximum 
payment, we have to prove that * *1 2(x ) (x ).c c<  Since neither x1 nor x2 is a target report, 
the comparison of Fa(x1) to Fa(x2) (Fa as defined above) yields the required contradiction 
by the MLRC.  Next, if the globally maximum payment obtains for r=x1, the MLRC 
ensures that the first-order conditions of N(x )c yield a higher payment than the first-order 
conditions of 1(x )c , in a similar fashion to the case where qˆ+1=N-1, which thus yields 
the required contradiction.   
Proceeding in this fashion until q= qˆ+1concludes the proof.    
Part (b): 
This part is based on Part (a), which proves that the contract is a strictly increasing 
function if it is not affected by LL.  If some (LCi) are binding, it is clear that when a 
given payment exceeds ℓ, all higher reports yield payments that exceed ℓ even more, and 
when a given payment is determined by ℓ, all lower reports pay ℓ as well.  It is 
straightforward to verify that the agent’s disclosure to the auditor is the best response to 
the piecewise contract.   Q.E.D.   
 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
 
The proof is based on showing that if there were a single payment at the level of ℓ, 
then the contract would elicit the truth only if the TIC were a flat wage at the level of ℓ, 
which violates assumption A1(ii).  Suppose, by contradiction, that there is at least one 
binding (LCi), i.e., s(xi,xi)=, which, by (TCij), implies that 
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∀ j, 1≤i-q≤j≤i+q≤N,    U(s(xi,xi)) = U(ℓ) ≥ piU(ℓ) + (1−pi)U(s(xj,xj)).  (A5)   
Rearranging (A5) yields 
 ∀ j, 1≤i-q≤j≤i+q≤N,    U(ℓ) ≥ U(s(xj,xj)).  (A6) 
However, because ℓ is the lowest feasible payment, 
∀ j, 1≤i-q≤j≤i+q≤N,     U(ℓ) ≤ U(s(xj,xj)). (A7) 
(A6) and (A7) hold only if both are a strict equality; i.e., s(xj,xj)= s(xi,xi)=ℓ.   A single 
payment of ℓ implies that all the payments within a distance of q must equal ℓ as well. 
Hence, by construction, it can be shown that all payments that are multiples of q distant 
are also equal to ℓ, and so on until the contract becomes a flat wage. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
The proof is based on the following two lemmas, whose proofs are available upon 
request from the authors. 
LEMMA A2: The contract is a non-decreasing function of the outcome. 
LEMMA A3:  
a) If s(xi-1,xi-1)= s(xi,xi), then both (TCi-1,i-1+q) and (TCi,i+q) are binding. 
b) s(xN,xN) > s(xN-1,xN-1). 
Part (a): Case 1: q=1.  
The proof is based on unraveling the contract from s(xN,xN) to s(x1,x1).  By Lemma 
A3, Part (b), s(xN,xN) > s(xN-1,xN-1).  We next prove that s(xN-2,xN-2) > s(xN-1,xN-1).  
Suppose, by contradiction, that it is not, i.e., by Lemma A2, s(xN-2,xN-2)= s(xN-1,xN-1).  
Then, by Lemma A3, Part (a),  
(TCN-2,N-1) and (TCN-1,N) are binding.   
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N-2 N-2 N-1 N-1U( (x ,x )) piU( ) (1 pi)U( (x ,x )).s s= + −  (A8) 
N-1 N-1 N NU( (x ,x )) piU( ) (1 pi)U( (x ,x )).s s= + −  (A9) 
Subtracting (A9) from (A8) yields the required contradiction, because N N(x ,x )s  > 
N-1 N-1(x ,x )s .  Proceeding in this fashion to 1 1(x ,x )s  completes the proof.  
Case 2: q>1, and at most one (TCiN) is binding.   
By Lemma (A2) and Lemma (A3), Part (a), j-1 j-1 j j(x ,x ) (x ,x )s s=  requires that two 
(TC) be binding.  Having just one implies that j-1 j-1 j j(x ,x ) (x ,x )s s< .   
Part (c):  The proof is immediate from the fact that deviation from truthful disclosure 
can be detected with some positive probability and penalized.  Q.E.D.   
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
When all (LCi) are binding for an RMC (with the exception of (LCNj)), the first N-1 
payments equal ℓ, and * N(x )c  is determined by (IC).  That is,  
[ ]
N-q-1N-1
N N i N i g p
i=N-q i=1
P U( (x )) + P piU( ) (1 pi)U( ( )) + P U( )=V( ) V( ),c c x a a∆ ∆ + − ∆ −∑ ∑    
 (A10) 
i i g i pwhere: P Prob[x ] Prob[x ].a a∆ = −  
In a TIC, s(xN,xN) is also solved from (IC), and the rest of the payments are found by 
(TCi,min{i+q,N}). Each payoff is a linear combination of ℓ and the maximum payment, 
*
N N(x , x )s ; the weights depend on the distance of the step to which the payment pertains 
from * N N(x , x )s , Qi. By (IC), 
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[ ]
i
N-1
N N N i N N
i=N-q
N-q-1
i N N g p
i=1
N-q-1
t
i
i=1
P U( (x , x )) + P piU( ) (1 pi)U( (x , x )) +
P U( ) + [U( (x , x )) U( )] V( ) V( ),
where  = P (1 pi) .
s s
s a a
∆ ∆ + −
∆ − Ω = −
Ω ∆ −
∑
∑
∑

   
 (A11) 
A comparison of the (IC)’s for TIC and for RMC shows that if Ω <0, 
*
N N(x , x )s > * N(x )c .  Next, define the probability ratio as g(i); i.e., g(i)= i g
i p
Prob(x )
Prob(x )
a
a
, 
where, by the MLRC, g is a strictly increasing function of i. 
i i g i p i pP Prob[x ] Prob[x ] Prob[x ][g(i) 1].a a a∆ = − = −  (A12) 
Since 
N
i g i p
i 1
Prob[x ] Prob[x ]=0, a a
=
−∑ by the MLRC, g(i) < 1 for low outcomes and  
g(i) > 1 for high outcomes, so that when q is large, i NNP[U( ) U( )]s∆ −  <0 pointwise, 
which implies that Ω <0.   
Completing the proof requires showing that qˆ  is the minimum q for which Ω <0 and 
that qˆ <N-1. At q=N-2, 1P 0,Ω ≈ ∆ <  since g1<1. To prove that qˆ  is the minimum q, note 
that, by definition, the lower q is, the greater the number of arguments that enter Ω 
(because the summation is from i=1 to i=N-q-1), and it(1 pi)− is an increasing function. 
Once Ω contains arguments with gi (weakly) exceeding one, each additional argument is 
positive; i.e., N-qi i
ˆ ˆN-q-1 N-(q-1)-1
tt t
i i N-q*
i=1 i=1
P (1 pi) P (1 pi) P (1 pi) 0.∆ − − ∆ − = ∆ − >∑ ∑  (A13) 
Parts (aii-aiii-b):  
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The proof is straightforward from Part (a) and the discussion in the text.  Part (b) is 
based on (IC.a), which is used to establish that * *N N N(x , x ) (x ).s c=   Hence, although the 
two contracts yield the agent the same payoff, the RMC offers the agent a lottery between 
ℓ and the maximum payment when xi < xN, while the TIC offers the certainty equivalent 
of this lottery.   Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: 
Since a TIC dominates an RMC  for low ℓ and, by Proposition 3, an RMC dominates 
a TIC for high ℓ, the proof is complete upon establishing that the contracts' costs is a 
monotone increasing function of ℓ, because then the contracts' costs intersect once, at the 
critical level ℓ'.  The change in the Lagrangian reflects the sensitivity of the cost to ℓ.  
The derivation of the Lagrangian, GT, T=S,C,
 
 with respect to ℓ yields ∂
∂
GT = 
k
k
TGϕ ∂
∂∑ 
 [ti−ℓ] −
k
kϕ∑ <0, kϕ = kδ =  if T=C, and kϕ = i,max{i+q,N}Sρ  if T=S. The inequality 
obtains because when kϕ >0 the term in brackets in the first argument on the right-hand 
side is zero. Q.E.D. 
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FIGURE 1: TIME-LINE OF MAIN EVENTS 
Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4 Date 5 Date 6 …Date 7 
 
The 
principal 
designs 
the 
contract, 
T. 
 
 
The  
agent 
chooses 
effort, a. 
 
 
The 
outcome, x, 
is realized, 
and it is 
observed by 
the agent 
alone. 
 
The agent 
discloses an 
outcome to a 
auditor. The 
monitor audits 
this disclosure. 
 
The 
principal 
receives 
the 
audited 
public 
report, r. 
 
The agent 
is paid t 
and quits. 
 
 
The principal 
collects his residual 
share, x−t(r). 
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FIGURE 2: AN ILLUSTRATION OF A PURE- 
STRATEGY RMC WHEN N=5 (q=1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
r r 
$$ 
No (LCi) is binding (LCi) are binding for k=3 
c1 
c2 
c3 
c4 
c5 
ℓ c1 c2           c3      
    c4 
c5 
ℓ 
 43 
FIGURE 3: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TIC  
PAYMENTS AND THE OUTCOME REPROTED TO THE PRINCIPAL 
WHEN N=5 AND q=2 
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FIGURE 4:  THE EXPECTED PAYMENT UNDER RMC 
AS A FUNCTION OF REPORTING FLEXIBILITY 
CONDITIONAL ON REALIZED OUTCOME (N=14 AND THE LL LEVEL IS 30)
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FIGURE 5: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE RISKINESS OF 
RMC AND REPORTING FLEXIBILITY (N=14)
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FIGURE 6: THE SAVINGS IN CONTRACTING COSTS UNDER RMC
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